ABSTRACT
The need for a defence policy that promotes conflict resolution without the use of force
has become expedient for the peace and stability of the Nigerian state and the Niger delta
in particular. Hence the study seeks to examine the nature of Nigeria’s defence policy
with empasis on the operation of the Joint Task Force particularly in the Niger Delta as
exemplified by its role in the resolution of conflicts from 1966 rebellion of Isaac Adaka
Boro, to Ken Saro-Wiwa’s non-violent approach which snowballed to the present
militancy in the name of movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
The objectives of the study was geared towards the formulation of defence policy that
will bring about the resolution of crises in the Niger Delta without the application of
brute force. The significance of the study was seen on two levels. On the theoretical level,
the study seeks to suggest a way of addressing Niger Delta crisis without the use of force
as the gap that exist in the literatures reviewed. While on the practical level the study
serves as a guide to defence policy planners as well as a reference material for future
researchers. Relevant literatures were reviewed in respect to the topic under study. We
relied much on the power theory as an explanatory paradigm and a guide for the study.
The method of data collection was qualitative hence we relied on secondary data sources.
The technique adopted for the analysis of data was the content analysis. The study
revealed that the strategy adopted by the JTF has not contributed to ameliorating the
crisis in the Niger Delta, as the reliance on developed countries for military hardware has
negatively affected their operational readiness resulting to severe civil-military relations
in the region. Hence, the study finally recommended measures of improving civilmilitary
relations wherein we suggested among others that, diplomats, scholars as well as
community and youths leaders be involved in defence policy formulation and
implementation in the Niger Delta as a requisite requirement for peace.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page - - - - - - - - - i
Approval page - - - - - - - - ii
Dedication - - - - - - - - - iii
Abstract - - - - - - - - - iv
Acknowledgement - - - - - - - - v
Abbreviations - - - - - - - - - vi
Table of contents - - - - - - - - vii
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the study - - - - - - - 1
1.2 Statement of the problem- - - - - - - 7
1.3 Objectives of the study - - - - - - - 9
1.4 Significance of the study - - - - - - - 11
1.5 Scope of the study- - - - - - - - 12
1.6 Literature review - - - - - -- - - 13
1.7 Theoretical framework - - - - - - - - 32
1.8 Hypotheses - - - - - - - - - 34
1.9 Methods of data collection - - - - - - - 35
1.10 Methods of data analysis - - - - - - - 35
CHAPTER TWO: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY AND THE NIGERIAN
MILITARY: A 21ST CENTURY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
2.1 History: - - - - - - - - - - 37
2.2 Strategy - - - - - - - - - - - 42
2.3 Tactics - - - - - - - - - 51
2.4 Logistics- - - - - - - - - 54
2.5 Science and Technology - - - - - - - 69
2.6 Geopolitics - - - - - - - - - 63
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2.7 Political System and Leadership -- - - - - - 63
2.8 Grand Strategy- - - - - - - - - 66
CHAPTER THREE: THE JOINT TASK FORCE AND THE STRATEGIES AND
TACTICS OF FAILURE
3.1 The socio-economic, political, economic and strategic issues faced by the JTF: - - - - - - - - - 70
3.2 The strategy and tactics of JTF - - - - - - 84
3.3 Why the JTF strategy and tactics failed - - - - - 88
CHAPTER FOUR
4.1 Alternative Strategies to the Niger Delta Crisis- - - - - 100
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Summary- - - - - - - - - - 129
5.2 Conclusions - - - - - - - - - 137
5.3 Recommendations - - - - - - - - 142
Bibliography - - - - - - - - - 144